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Labor and Employment Law
by Richard Gerakitis*
James P. Ferguson, Jr.*
and
Dorothy E. Larkin'°*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1999 and 2000 decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in which the court addressed
issues in the areas of labor and employment law. Specifically, this
Article examines decisions by the Eleventh Circuit under the (1) Family
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"); 1 (2) Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"); 2 (3) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII");3 (4) Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"); 4 (5)
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); 5 and (6) Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA").' During the past two years, the Eleventh Circuit
decided numerous cases involving issues of interest concerning labor and
employment law. Because of the volume of cases, this Article does not
attempt to address each significant case decided by the Eleventh Circuit
on these issues. Still, several particularly noteworthy cases, including
cases of first impression, were decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 1999
and 2000.

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP. University of Georgia (B.A., magna
cum laude, 1978); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 1981).
** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP. University of Georgia (B.A., 1994);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 2000).
*** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP. University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill (B.A., 1996); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2000).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

Terminationof Employee on FMLA Leave

In O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc.,' the primary issue,
which was one of first impression in this circuit, regarded the scope of
employment protection afforded by the FMLA; specifically, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed "the circumstances under which an employer may
terminate an employee on FMLA leave."' Affirming the district court's
grant of summary judgment to defendant employer, the court held that
the FMLA does not preclude an employer from terminating an employee
who is on FMLA leave if the employer can demonstrate it would have
terminated the employee regardless of the employee's FMLA leave.9
Plaintiff O'Connor brought suit against PCA Family Health Plan, Inc.
("PCA"), "her former employer, claiming PCA violated the FMLA by
terminating her employment and attendant benefits while she was
exercising her statutory right to FMLA leave." ° The employer
undertook a reduction in force ("RIF") while plaintiff was on FMLA
leave. Plaintiff was one of the employees whose job was slated to be
eliminated due to the RIF. After finding out that she had been
terminated, plaintiff contacted her employer's human resources
department to inquire about her termination. The human resources
manager informed plaintiff that she had been inadvertently placed on
the RIF list and offered to reinstate her employment. However, plaintiff
declined reinstatement and sued her employer for violation of the
FMLA."
The court concluded that, in terminating plaintiff's employment, her
employer did not violate the FMLA, because plaintiff would have been
terminated regardless of her FMLA leave.' 2 The court noted that "an
employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and
conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously
employed during the FMLA leave period." is Because plaintiff's job
would have been eliminated by the RIF even if she had not been on
FMLA leave, there was no FMLA violation. The court stated that the
burden was on the employer to show that it would have taken the same

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1354-55.
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
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action even if the employee was not out on FMLA leave.14 Given the
evidence presented, specifically the loss of jobs resulting from the RIF,
the court concluded that the employer had met its burden and dismissed
plaintiff's claim. 5
B.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity for States
In Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of
Trustees 6 ("UAB"), two consolidated cases raised a question being
litigated in various jurisdictions-whether a state is immune from suits
by state employees asserting rights under certain federal laws. 7 The
federal laws in question were the FMLA, the ADA, and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.18 Reversing the summary judgment of
the district court entered for UAB on plaintiffs' ADA claims, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a state is not immune from suit under the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.19 However, the court held that states
do have Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the provision
of the FMLA dealing with leave for a state employee due to her own
serious health condition.2 °
According to the Eleventh Circuit, even if the expression of congressional intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity from FMLA claims was
sufficiently clear (which the court declined to decide), Congress did not
have authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states on

14. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (1999)).
15. Id. at 1354-55.
16. 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001). The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that state employees may
not bring suit to recover money damages for the state's violation of Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990. 531 U.S. at _. The Court found that Congress did not
validly abrogate states' immunity from suit as guaranteed under the Eleventh Amendment
because the legislative history and record supporting the ADA lacked any substantial
pattern of "irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled." Id. at.
Moreover, the Court stressed that the incongruence of the rights and remedies afforded by
the ADA did not indicate Congress intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
See id. at -.
17. Id. at 1216.
18. Id.
19. 193 F.3d at 1218.
20. Id. at 1219. The court noted that
[a]lthough the FMLA may be most commonly known for its provisions affording
employees leave for the birth or adoption of a child or to care for a child, spouse
or parent with a serious health condition, the provision at issue here deals with
leave for the employee due to her own serious health condition.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D)).
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claims arising under the FMLA.2" The court reached this conclusion by
finding that the FMLA's invocation of the Equal Protection Clause did
not relate to the leave provision allowed an employee with a serious
health condition.22
III.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

23
In Chapman v.AI Transportation,
the Eleventh Circuit decided two

important issues that arise frequently in job discrimination cases: (1)
whether an employer can select its own criteria for making employment
decisions; and (2) whether an employer can use subjective criteria in
making employment decisions.24 The court first reaffirmed that an
employer may offer any honest explanation for its employment decision
provided that the decision was not motivated by the employee's
membership in a protected category. 25 Second, the court held that a
subjective reason can constitute a legally sufficient legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason provided the employer "articulates a clear and
reasonably specific factual basis upon which it based its subjective
opinion."28
In Chapman plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination after
he was not hired for the position of Casualty Claims Manager. The focus
of his ADEA case surrounded the employer's two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its failure to hire plaintiff.27 First, plaintiff was not
selected because of his lack of "stability in light of the number of jobs he
had held in a short period of time," an objective reason.28 Second,

21. Id. at 1210-20.
22. Id. at 1220.
23. 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000).
24. Id. at 1016.
25. Id. at 1030. The rule remains that
(flederal courts "do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an
entity's business decisions. No matter how medieval a firm's practices, no matter
how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm's
managers, the ADEA does not interfere. Rather our inquiry is limited to whether
the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior."
Id. (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)).
26. Id. at 1034. "Indeed, subjective evaluations of a job candidate are often critical to
the decisionmaking process, and if anything, are becoming more so in our increasingly

service-oriented economy." Id. at 1033.
27.

Id. at 1017-18. In his lawsuit, plaintiff also alleged a violation of the ADA. He was

terminated for his refusal to travel, which he claimed to be a result of a heart condition.
Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a panel of the Eleventh Circuit's decision upholding the
district court's refusal to grant a new trial for plaintiff after the jury returned a verdict

against him on his ADA claims. Id. at 1037.
28. Id. at 1028.
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plaintiff's "poor interview" was the subjective reason he was not
selected.2 9 Plaintiff asserted in response to the employer's legitimate
reasons that he had "established a record as evidenced by his performance appraisals which were a more immediate indication of his
stability," and he offered evidence that several other candidates for the
position had worked for numerous employers."0 The Eleventh Circuit
noted that plaintiff did not rebut the employer's legitimate reasons for
its decision. 3 ' Instead, plaintiff recast the employer's reasons. The
court concluded: "Provided that the proffered reason is one that might
motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason
head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply
quarreling with the wisdom of that reason." 2 The Eleventh Circuit
found that the employer's justification for its employment decision was
reasonable; therefore, the fact that plaintiff did not rebut the reason
shows that plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of pretext.33
As for the subjective reason why the employer did not hire plaintiff,
the court held that this was a legally sufficient, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.34 The employer noted that plaintiff was not aggressive
in his interview, and his answers were imprecise, especially with regard
to his work history. 5 Plaintiff did not attempt to rebut the employer's
subjective reason, nor did plaintiff properly rebut the employer's
objective reason (job instability).36 Because the employer backed up its
subjective reason with "clear and reasonably specific bases," the
Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employer.3
IV.

TITLE

VII

OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
In Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit addressed several
factors in examining sexual harassment claims. In the absence of a

A.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1029-30.
Id.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1036-37.
195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999).
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tangible employment action,3 9 what exactly constitutes conduct that is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment'" includes both
a subjective and an objective component. 4' After examining the
evidence in the context of the totality of the circumstances, the court
held the conduct alleged by plaintiff "falls well short of the level of either
sufficient to alter [plaintiff's] terms or
severe or pervasive conduct
41
conditions of employment."

Specifically, in Mendoza, the court analyzed the fact-intensive inquiry
under the objective component of the sexual harassment analysis.42
The Supreme Court, along with the Eleventh Circuit, identified four
factors to be considered in determining whether alleged conduct has
"objectively altered" the terms and conditions of employment: "(1) the
frequency of the supervisor's conduct; (2) the severity of his conduct; (3)
whether his conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes
with employee's job performance."4 3
In Mendoza plaintiff brought an action against her former employer
alleging numerous discrimination claims in addition to her claim of
sexual harassment under Title VII. 44 Her sexual harassment claim

centered on four categories of conduct by her supervisor: (1) one
statement by plaintiff's supervisor to plaintiff when he said "I'm getting
fired up"; (2) one occasion when plaintiff's supervisor rubbed his hip
against plaintiff's hip while touching her shoulder and smiling; (3) two
instances in which her supervisor looked at her groin and sniffed and
one instance of sniffing without looking at plaintiff's groin; and (4) in
plaintiff's words, her supervisor's pattern of constantly following her and
staring at plaintiff in a "very obvious fashion."45
In reaching its conclusion that the supervisor's conduct was not
actionable under Title VII, the court analyzed numerous sexual

39. "When a Plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal
to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment
decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is
actionable under Title VII." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998).
40. 195 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Meritor & Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)).
41. Id. at 1247.
42. Id. at 1246.
43. Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
44. Id. at 1242. The only claim at issue in this appeal, however, was plaintiffs claim
of sexual harassment. All of plaintiffs other claims were dismissed on summary judgment
or at trial on defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id.
45. Id. at 1242-43.
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harassment cases from various circuits in which comparable conduct was
found not actionable under Title VII.46 In analyzing plaintiff's claim
under the four-factor analysis, the Eleventh Circuit found three of the
four factors-physically threatening or humiliating conduct, interference
Finally,
with job performance, and severity-"clearly absent."47
plaintiff did not create a jury issue on whether her testimony of constant
staring and following established the fourth factor of the analysis,
frequency." The court reasoned that plaintiff did not characterize this
"staring" and "following" as stalking or leering and further reasoned,
taking into account normal office interaction, these allegations are not
examples of conduct actionable under Title VIi.49 Even considering all
of the allegations together and in context, plaintiff still did not have a
case of actionable sexual harassment: "Were we to conclude that the
conduct established by [plaintiff] was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter her terms or conditions of employment, we would establish a
baseline of actionable conduct that is far below that established by other
circuits."" As such, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of judgment as a matter of law to the employer on plaintiff's Title
VII claim.5 1
Title VII Class Actions
In Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems ("Avis"),52 the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's class certification of plaintiffs' class
action alleging that Avis denied plaintiffs the right to make and enforce
contracts because of their (Jewish) ethnicity in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981." 3 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendant's reservation
center instructed its employees not to open corporate rental accounts for
Jewish individuals. Plaintiff Rutstein moved that the district court
certify a class, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and
B.

46. Id. at 1246-47. Four judges dissented in the case, taking issue with the majority's
analysis of plaintiffs sexual harassment claim; the dissent accused the majority of
analyzing each allegation of harassment individually instead of considering all the
circumstances in context. Id. at 1257-58 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). In a second dissent, two
judges did not believe the majority should have affirmed the directed verdict for defendant
on plaintiffs sexual harassment claim. Id. at 1269 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1248.
48. Id. at 1249.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1251.
51. Id. at 1253.
52. 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000).
53. Id. at 1230-31.
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23(b)(3), of Jewish individuals who were allegedly denied such corporate
accounts.54
Finding that the district court's class certification was an abuse of
discretion, the Eleventh Circuit reversed class certification because
"most, if not all, of the plaintiffs' claims will stand or fall, not on the
answer to the question whether [Avis] has a practice or policy of [ethnic]
discrimination, but on the resolution of... highly case-specific factual
issues."" The court reasoned that whether Avis has a policy of
discriminating against Jewish individuals may be relevant, but that
policy "cannot establish that the company intentionally discriminated
against every member of the putative class."58 The court remanded for
determination of case-specific issues such as (1) whether defendant
actually denied each particular plaintiff a corporate account; (2) whether
each plaintiff met the financial criteria for a corporate account; and (3)
expected use of defendant's
whether the nature of each plaintiff's
57
vehicles was cost efficient to defendant.
Notably, the court stated that its decision does not represent the end
of disparate treatment class actions in this circuit.58 To determine
whether class action status is appropriate, however, the court stated that
parties should examine the substantive law "relating to the cause of
action that is common to each class member ...

as well as to the type

of relief sought and whether that relief is capable of class-wide
resolution or is necessarily individualized."5 9 The predominant element
of compensatory and punitive damages thus triggers a case-specific
inquiry inimical to class-wide resolution. 0
V.

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

Statute of Limitations
Harrison v. Digital Health Plan6 decided
applicable to plaintiff's claim for wrongful
ERISA. The Eleventh Circuit held that the
borrowed the six-year statute of limitations

A.

the statute of limitations
denial of benefits under
district court should have
period governing contract

54. Id. at 1231.

55. Id. at 1235 (quoting Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1241.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 183 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1999).
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actions instead of the one-year limitations period applicable to workers'
compensation claims.6 2
Plaintiff was employed by Digital Equipment Corporation and
participated in the company's self-funded employee health plan. The
plan covered employees' expenses for care that is medically necessary
and nonexperimental for treatment of injury or disease. During her
employment, plaintiff was diagnosed with several medical conditions and
was treated extensively for her illnesses. The majority of the claims she
submitted were denied.6 3
Plaintiff filed suit in district court raising a claim for wrongful denial
of benefits under ERISA, several state law claims, failure to provide
proper notification of her rights under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), and breach of fiduciary duty. The
district court dismissed the state law claims as preempted by ERISA and
found that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for her claim of
breach of fiduciary duty. Finally, the district court found plaintiff's
ERISA and COBRA claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of her
complaint because her claim was outside the statute 6of4 limitations and
to the dismissal of her breach of fiduciary duty claim.
The only issue on appeal was whether the district court correctly
applied the one-year statute of limitations for plaintiff's ERISA claim. 5
The Eleventh Circuit found no error in the dismissal of plaintiff's
COBRA and breach of fiduciary duty claims. 6 In its opinion, the court
first examined the statute of limitations applicable to ERISA claims.
Because ERISA has no statute of limitations provision, federal courts
borrow from the forum state the statute of limitations period most
analogous to the cause of action under the state law.67 This process is
known as "closing the gap" left by Congress in ERISA so as to fashion
federal common law to supplement ERISA. s
The Eleventh Circuit first characterized the essence of plaintiff's claim.
The court considered plaintiff's claim under ERISA for the wrongful
denial of medical benefits, which was a contract action because her
benefits were guaranteed under the terms of plaintiff's self-funded

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1237.
at 1237-38 & n.3.
at 1237.
at 1238.
at 1239.
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employee health plan.69 In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that other circuits have adopted the limitations period for contract
claims for wrongful denial of benefits claims under ERISA.7 ° The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's finding that plaintiff's claim
was most analogous to a workers' compensation claim.71 Instead, the
court determined that, while many of her claims were for medical
treatment for work-environment related illnesses, the nature of a
workers' compensation claim is not a contractual program but rather a
form of strict liability requiring employers to compensate employees for
work-related injuries.72 In contrast, a claim for denial of medical
benefits, even if the claims are work-related, is an action that rests on
the benefits provided in the employee health plan. Therefore, this action
was most like a contract. 7' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
part of the district court's order that dismissed plaintiff's ERISA claim
and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its holding
that the six-year statute of limitations provided by Georgia
law for
74
simple contract actions applies to plaintiff's ERISA claim.
B.

Exhaustion of Administrative Procedures
In Perrino v. Southern Bell,75 the Eleventh Circuit was confronted
with the question whether plaintiffs who bring a claim arising under
ERISA must exhaust administrative procedures when their employer
does not comply with ERISA's procedural requirement that an employer
must establish a reasonable claims procedure. 7' Because plaintiffs had
access to a grievance and arbitration procedure through their collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA"), and because this complaint procedure
provided an adequate legal remedy for their ERISA claims, plaintiffs
were required
to exhaust this process before filing an action in federal
77
court.

Plaintiffs were all former covered employees of BellSouth Communications, Inc. ("BellSouth"). During their employment, plaintiffs became
disabled and received long-term disability benefits from BellSouth.
Under plaintiff's CBA, certain employees were entitled to a termination

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1239-40.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1240-42.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
Id. at 1242.
209 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1311.
Id.
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pay allowance separate from any disability benefits paid to employees."
The CBA also contained a grievance and arbitration procedure for the
resolution of disputes "adversely affecting the rights of any employee."79
Under the CBA, a person had sixty days to present a grievance for
review.s °
Plaintiffs filed suit against BellSouth essentially alleging that they
were entitled to termination pay allowance pursuant to the CBA and
that the termination pay provisions under the CBA qualified as an
employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA. The district court entered
summary judgment for BellSouth on the theory that plaintiffs failed to
exhaust administrative remedies available prior to filing suit, and
plaintiffs appealed."'
The Eleventh Circuit first ruled that the termination pay provisions
constituted an ERISA plan, and, as such, plaintiffs were obligated to
exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing an action in
federal court.82 Plaintiffs did not file grievances as provided in the
CBA and argued that they should be excused from the exhaustion
requirement for two reasons: (1) exhaustion should not be required
when an ERISA plan fails to comply with ERISA regulations, and (2) the
grievance procedures were not available to ex-employees and, therefore,
resorting to this procedure was futile. 3
As for plaintiffs' first argument, the Eleventh Circuit noted that courts
strictly enforce the ERISA exhaustion requirement.8 4 Courts have only
carved out two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: (1) when
"resort to administrative remedies would be futile or the remedy
inadequate,'" 5 and (2) when "'meaningful access'" to the administrative
review scheme is denied. 6 Plaintiffs argued that the failure of the
employer to comply with ERISA's technical requirements should excuse
exhaustion. In fact, BellSouth had not complied with ERISA regulations
in two ways: (1) Bell South did not formalize its plan with a separate
summary plan description, and (2) the grievance and arbitration
procedure provided by the CBA did not explicitly indicate that "employ-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1311-12.
1312.
1313.
1311, 1313-14.
1315.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 1316 (quoting Counts v. American Gen. Life &Accidental Ins. Co., 111 F.3d
105, 108 (11th Cir. 1997)).

86. Id. (quoting Curry v. Contract Fabricators, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842,
846-47 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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ees could file termination allowance claims or obtain independent review
of these claims if they were denied by the plan administrator."8 7
The Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument, noting that the
district court found that the grievance and arbitration procedure was
available to plaintiffs to address their eligibility for termination
allowances.88 Further, there was no evidence that plaintiffs were
unaware or lacked knowledge of the grievance procedure, and there was
evidence that similarly situated ex-employees had grieved a denial of
termination pay pursuant to the CBA's grievance procedure.89 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that, "while technically deficient, the
Agreement's [CBA] administrative scheme was available to Appellants
for the review and arbitration of their ERISA termination allowance
claims, and that if the process had been invoked, Appellants could have
received independent arbitration and an adequate legal remedy for their
claims." ° Further, the court reasoned: "[I]f a reasonable administrative scheme is available to a plaintiff and offers the potential for an
adequate legal remedy, then a plaintiff must first exhaust the administrative scheme before filing a federal suit."9'
The Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' second argument that utilizing
the grievance procedure would be futile because plaintiffs never
attempted to invoke the grievance procedure and several ex-employees
had had grievances filed for them by the Union regarding terminationrelated grievances.9 2 The court concluded that a theoretical assertion
of futility does not excuse plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.93 Thus, the court affirmed in full the district court's grant of
summary judgment.9 4
VI.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

In Falken v. Glynn County, Georgia,95 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the issue of whether the county violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
by not paying certain fire department employees compensation for
overtime hours worked.98 Specifically, the court analyzed whether the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 1316-17.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
197 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1344.
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partial exemption under section 207(k) of the FLSA for employees
engaged in "fire protection activities" applied to the county's emergency
medical services ("EMS") responders trained and certified as firefighters.9 7 The Eleventh Circuit applied the 1995 Department of Labor
("DOL") opinion letter discussing the test for whether dual-function
EMS/firefighters fall within the FLSA fire protection activities exemption.9"
Although employed by the fire department, plaintiffs are both certified
firefighters and EMS workers. Because of their dual role, these EMS
workers' functions overlap with the firefighters, meaning these dualfunction EMS employees have the responsibility to fight fires even if no
medical assistance is required at the emergency.9 9
The county appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment
to plaintiffs. The district court held that the EMS workers were not
exempt employees under the "fire protection activities" exception, and
thus, the county was obligated to pay the EMS workers overtime
compensation. ° ° The district court found that the EMS employees did
not satisfy part three of the DOL's regulations implementing the FLSA,
which states that a "person who spends more than 20 percent of his/her
working time on nonexempt activities is not considered to be an
employee engaged in fire protection ... activities."0 1 The district
court noted that the county's EMS employees engaged in nonexempt
medical functions outside the scope of firefighting dispatches for more
than twenty percent of the EMS employees' total worktime "2
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court applied the
wrong legal standard in analyzing whether the county's EMS employees
are exempt under the FLSA. The district court applied the test for
EMS-only employees, whereas the EMS employees were both EMS
employees and firefighters.0 3 This misapplication of standards could
have been significant because the exempt activities of dual-function

97. Id.
98. Id. at 1353.
99. Id. at 1344.
100. Id. at 1344-45.
101. Id. at 1347 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 553.212(a)).
102. Id. at 1351. The district court reviewed the Eleventh Circuit case of O'Neal v.
Barrow County Board of Commissioners, 980 F.2d 674, 681 (11th Cir. 1993), which
articulated what is considered exempt and nonexempt work for EMS employees. 197 F.3d
at 1345. The court in O'Neal concluded that activities such as medical activities not
related to firefighting are nonexempt activities. 980 F.2d at 682.
103. 197 F.3d at 1351.
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EMS/firefighter employees are broader in scope than those for EMS-only
0 4
employees."
In 1995 the DOL issued an opinion letter concluding that dualfunction EMS/firefighters should be evaluated under a different standard
than EMS-only employees. °5 The primary difference in the analysis
between dual function and EMS-only employees is the third part of the
test, the 80/20 rule. For dual-function employees, medical functions are
exempt activities, whereas medical functions are not exempt activities
for EMS-only employees.' ° The DOL letter requires two additional
tests to determine whether a dual-function employee is exempt under
the FLSA: (1) that the employee is a firefighter,' 7 and (2) that the
EMS units are trained in rescue and EMS units are dispatched regularly
to emergencies related to firefighting.118 These two tests are also
required for the EMS-only employees. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that
the district court correctly evaluated these tests as applied to plaintiffs.' O9 However, finding that the district court incorrectly treated the
dual-function EMS/firefighter medical functions as nonexempt, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded for a clarification regarding the EMS
activities completed during the EMS employees' waiting time to
determine what percentage of the dual function employees' day consisted
of performing either firefighting or EMS medical functions."0
VII.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

In Shields v. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Co.,"' plaintiff, a
former employee, sued his former employer for wrongful termination
under the ADA. Prior to his suit in federal court, plaintiff sought
unemployment benefits through a Georgia superior court. The superior
court held that plaintiff was not terminated because of his status as an
HIV-positive male, and relying on the superior court's ruling, the federal
district
court dismissed plaintiff's lawsuit based on collateral estop2
pel.1
The Eleventh Circuit found no violation of federal due process, but
instead, certified to the Georgia Supreme Court the state law question

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1349.
Id.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 553.210(a)(1)-(4).
Id. § 553.215.
197 F.3d at 1353.

110. Id. at 1352.
111. 228 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2000).
112. Id. at 1285-86.
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of whether plaintiff's wrongful termination claim would be collaterally
estopped under Georgia law based on the superior court's ruling." 3
Noting the extensive procedures of Georgia's unemployment benefits
compensation scheme, the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff was given
a "full and fair opportunity" to pursue his wrongful termination claim at
the state court level." 4 Despite reasoning that plaintiff's federal due
process requirements were not violated, the Eleventh Circuit certified its
question to the Georgia Supreme Court because "this case turns on a
difficult interpretive question concerning Georgia collateral estoppel
law.""
The court noted that "[wihen such doubt exists as to the
application of state law, a federal court should certify the question to the
state supreme court to avoid making unnecessary state law guesses and
to offer
the state court the opportunity to interpret or change existing
116
law."

113. Id. at 1290.
114. Id. at 1289.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1289-90 (quoting Pogue v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 82 F.3d 1012,1017(11th
Cir. 1996)).
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